The application of the principle of double jeopardy in the face of overlapping administrative and criminal sanctions in Ecuador

Abstract

The principle of double jeopardy (non bis in idem) is an essential guarantee of due process that limits the exercise of the state's power to punish (ius puniendi) by prohibiting the duplication of trials or sanctions with respect to the same subject, act, and grounds. In the Ecuadorian context, its application acquires special relevance in the face of overlapping administrative and criminal sanctions, a scenario that reveals tensions between the autonomy of administrative sanctioning power and criminal jurisdiction. The objective of this research was to analyze the scope and limits of the principle of double jeopardy (non bis in idem) in Ecuador, based on a systematic study of its normative configuration and the jurisprudential development of the Constitutional Court of Ecuador. The methodology adopted a qualitative approach with a legal-doctrinal and jurisprudential design, based on the analysis of constitutional norms, the Organic Administrative Code, and relevant rulings. The results show that the Court has consolidated the triple identity test—subject, act, and grounds—as the central standard for determining violations of the principle, also incorporating criteria of proportionality and compelling social need in scenarios of concurrent sanctions. However, regulatory gaps persist in defining the identity of the grounds, leading to interpretive inconsistencies and a risk of excessive punishment. It is concluded that the Ecuadorian system requires greater coordination between administrative and criminal proceedings, strengthening the coherent and rights-based application of the principle of double jeopardy (non bis in idem) in harmony with legal certainty and human dignity.